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Abstract
Contracts are a condition for the emergence of cooperation in economic activity. In
the agricultural sector, farmers’ cooperation contracts will affect the distribution of
income, which in turn will also affect their level of welfare. Cultivation of rice fields in
Legundi Village, Karangjati Subdistrict, Ngawi Regency is carried out in the form of
a cooperation contract involving the owners of the fields, the cultivators of the fields
and farm laborers. This study aims to explore the existence of these contracts using
the perspective of institutional economics and Islamic economics. The institutional
perspective aims to identify the principal-agent position and analyze contractual
problems arising from the employment relationship with agency theory indicators.
While the perspective of Islamic economics aims to analyze how the form of the
contract conforms with Islamic legal indicators. In this study, data collection procedures
were carried out through interviews with respondents involved in all aspects of the rice
cultivation cooperation contract. Data analysis begins by identifying the contract then
analyzing the contractual issues. The contract identification results show that from an
institutional perspective, the principal agent of the contract actors is the owner of a
pure rice field or a rice field owner who doubles as a cultivator of a paddy as a principal.
Based on sharia perspective this study found two forms of cooperation, namely ijarah
which consists of ijarah ’ala al-a’yan and ijarah’ ala al-a’mal and mukhabarah. The results
of the analysis of the contract problem show that from an institutional perspective there
is a moral hazard found in the production sharing contract, conflicting objectives in
the lease contract, and adverse selection between the farmer group and Bulog. From
the perspective of sharia there is an unclear risk of crop failure, lack of awareness of
paying zakat mal, and the emergence of the risk of mutual suspicion in the mukhabarah.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Farmer’s Contract, Sharia Perspective
1. Introduction
The agricultural sector is constantly changing, including institutional changes. Institu-
tional changes in the agricultural sector must have produced a different distribution
pattern than the previous. One of the changes is the change in working relationships
that experienced a deep formalization so that the space for farmers to avoid the risk
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of becoming increasingly narrowed. In this kind of institutional model, landownership
positions become stronger than peasants (Yustika & Baks, 2015).
One of the institutional changes that Yustika mentioned was the change in working
relationships, not least in the complex agricultural world. In the success of agriculture
of a village, there are relationships between the parties involved in the cultivation of
rice fields, among owners, farmers / farm workers and farmers groups to Bulog and
other related institutions. The working relationship will determine the proportion of
economic ratios to be shared with rural economic actors (Yustika & Baks, 2015). One
type of the institutional economy is contract theory. The contract generally illustrates
the agreement of one principal to take action that has economic value on the other
side, of course with the consequence of reciprocal action or payment. Therefore, in this
study selected institutional relationship work as a focus of research that matches the
approach of contract theory or the theory of principal-agent.
Simply put, every economic activity requires a contract. There is a contract between
the hotel owner and the hotel manager, there is a contract between the agencymanager
and his subordinate staff, there is also a contract between the owner of the rice field
and the rice field farmer. Contracts serve to regulate and limit the behavior of individuals
in the future, it is expected that the behavior of each individual involved in the contract
does not harm each other. Simply put, an optimal contract is needed to get people
to work together as well as possible. Hart and Holmstörm (2016) formulate a contract
theory which essentially answers two main points: (1) why contracts vary in design and
(2) good design to achieve the optimal goals of each company (in this case cultivation
of rice fields).
Mallor, et al (2004: 174) convey essentially the law of a contract is the implementation
of a promise or set of appointments. In other words, when a set of appointments has
been in contract status, a person who has been harmed by a breach of contract may
ask the government (court) to force the offending party to enter into / adhere to the
contract. Some basic elements of the creation of a contract can be shown in Figure 1
as follows:
The chart expressed by Mallor et al. (2004: 174) describes the process of the occur-
rence of a contract and if one or more elements are not met, the contract will not be
created. The contract is essentially an agreement obtained through a bid process, made
and then voluntarily agreed by someone who has the capacity to make a contract. The
purpose of a contract must be legal and, in almost all cases, an agreement must be
supported by some consideration (an agreement to agree on legal value).




(offer and acceptence) 
Voluntary? 
Consideration? 
Capacity?  No Contract! 
   
Legality? 
  
Contract! Writing Required ?  
   
   
Figure 1: Creation of a Contract
In reality, information is always not perfect (asymmetric information). That is, like
the Varian (1993: 306) statement, this is a situation where one side can not know
(observe) the action of the other party. And this imperfect information is the source of the
emergence of the principal-agent principal particularly in relation to moral hazard and
adverse selection. Moral Hazard can be defined as follows: the agent makes a decision
(action) that affects his satisfaction and not the principal; while the principal sees /
observes ”the outcome”, an imperfect signal of a decision; the action of a spontaneously
determined agent is not a Pareto-optimal (Manzilati: 2011: 32).
Contract violation which is a serious problem in economic activity (transaction) is the
absence of equality among economic actors. The inequality can be a bargaining position
as well as asymmetric information. The implication is that there are some / some parties
who gain profit on the expense (loss) of others. Of course economic activity is not an
ideal activity because there are one / several parties who become victims. Therefore,
it is necessary to find mechanisms and design of rules of the game (a institutional) that
aims to build equality between economic actors, both in terms of bargaining power and
completeness of information. At this point the existence of contract theory is very big
role in designing the rules of the game (Yustika, 2012: 78).
One of the basic philosophies of Islamic teachings in economic and business activities
(agriculture), namely the prohibition to cheat and tyranny. All transactions conducted
by a Muslim must be based on the principle of willingly willing (interadin minkum),
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and no one should be oppressive or tyrannized. Supposedly if the majority Muslim
community of Indonesia applies the spiritual values contained in the principles of sharia
in the agricultural sector (specifically) and other economic sectors (in general), it is not
impossible that a welfare will be achieved, because Allah SWT has repeatedly, time
speaks in the Qur’an to stay away from His prohibitions and carry out His commands.
The problem of muamalah is a matter that is very little studied seriously, because
so far there is the assumption that muamalah problem is a mundane problem that is
not at all bound by divine values (Haroen in Furqan, 2016: 2). Whereas the application
of sharia principles in muamalah which contains agreements in agriculture is a form
of effort to protect from the emergence of forms of dzalim such as the existence of
asymetric information and moral hazard.
Some of the previous studies that have discussed farmers’ cooperation contracts
include research conducted by Asfi Manzilati in 2010 under the title Implications of
Farming Business Contracts with Companies towards Farming Business Sustainability
(Study of Corn Commodities). The analysis in this case yields the conclusion that
farming contracts with companies have implications economically, ecologically and
institutionally. Other research conducted by M. Furqan 2016 with the title Influence of Al-
Muzara’ah and Al-Mukhabarah Principles on Production Sharing Agreements Agriculture
(Study in Semadam District Southeast Aceh Regency). The analysis in this case yields
the conclusion that the majority carry out contracts not carried out in a manner written as
well as there are still many inhibiting factors in application of muzara’ah andmukhabarah
agreements, and methods dispute resolution has occurred through stages correct.
Some of these studies form the basis of researchers ’arguments about the importance
of conducting studies of farmers’ cooperation contracts.
2. Method
According to Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S (2009: 2 in Leksono) Qualitative research
is the focus of attention with a variety of methods, including interpretive and natural-
istic approaches to the subject of the study. With a variety of methods that can be
used to understand something phenomenon in accordance with its focus, qualitative
research does not specifically have its ownmethod. Through interpretive and naturalistic
approach then obtained from the subject of economic actors examined is not limited to
data, but more accurately referred to as information (Leksono, 2013: 65). On that basis
the researchers decided to use qualitative methods of economics, where the meaning
of the phenomenon that later became useful information to be analyzed according to
DOI 10.18502/kss.v4i9.7335 Page 342
ICIEHI
his approach. Based on the context of the study of phenomena from the observation
or grand tour, the researchers used a descriptive economic model as a suitable type of
research in this study.
To describe, or description in Indonesian vocabulary means to describe or describe.
According Vardiansyah (2008: 9), descriptive research is the effort of data processing
into something that can be expressed clearly and precisely with the aim to be under-
stood by people who do not directly experience it themselves. So that is meant by
descriptive qualitative research is an approach to something behavior, phenomenon,
event, problem or certain circumstance which become object of investigation; whose
findings are descriptions of meaningful sentences that explain certain understandings.







   
  Shariah Data 








Conclusion      
Figure 2: Qualitative Research Design
Research subject is internally that is owner of paddy field, rice field farmer, and farm
laborer. While externally that is farmer group and. Bulog. The study was conducted on
the even semester of the academic year 2017/2018 for ± 3 months. The following 3
shows the relationship between subjects:
Contract problems in Legundi Village taken from institutional perspective and sharia
perspective can be analyzed based on the indicators in table 1 as follows:
TABLE 1: Indicator of Problem Analysis of Contract
Institutional Shariah
Definitions and Characteristics of Asymmetric
Information Theories of the Agency Theory
Rukun and Terms of Agreement (Contract)
a) Moral Hazard a) Rent (Ijarah)
Fatwa DSN MUI No. 112/DSN-MUI/IX/2017
b) Conflicting Objectives b) Profit Sharing (Mukhabarah)
c) Adverse Selection Jumhur Ulama dan UU No. 2 Tahun 1960
Source: Data Processed
The process of drawing conclusions on the data obtained during the research by
looking for models, themes, relationships, similarities and things that often arise. In








: Principal       : Internal 
: Agent : External 
: Relationship between Intenal and External 
Figure 3: Relationship Between Subjects
decision-making, it is based on data reduction and data presentation which is the
answer to the issues raised in the research. Stages of qualitative data analysis can be
seen in Figure 4 below:
Data Collection  Data Presentation 
   
Data Reduction 
Data Verification 
Figure 4: Qualitative Data Analysis Miles & Huberman
From the many ways to check the validity of the findings, indirectly researcher do
triangulation. Triangulation is a technique of examining the validity of data that utilizes
something other than that data for checking purposes or as a comparison against it
(Moelong 1996: 178). Triangulation techniques, where researchers use different data
collection to get data from the same source. Researcher used in-depth interviews and
documentation for the same source of data as well. Triangulation of data sources is to
get data from different sources with the same technique. So the use of triangulation is
expected to get valid and verifiable data although using different sources, techniques
and times. The triangulation picture is described in Figure 5 below:
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  Different Source 
   
   
Same Data 
  
 Different Tecniques   
   
   
   
  Different Time 
   
Figure 5: Triangulation As A Technique Checking Data Validity
3. Result and Discussion
3.1. Institutional Perspective and Shariah Perspective on Contract
of Rice Field Cultivation at Legundi Village
Legundi village is located in Karangjati district, Ngawi Regency, East Java Province. The
village is about 21 kilometers from the capital of Ngawi and 1 kilometer from Karangjati.
Legundi village borders to the north is Rejomulyo village, south of Sawo village, east of
Krebet village and west of Karangjati district. In the Village Profiles (Prodeskel) 2016, it
is mentioned that the Legundi Village has an area of paddy field reaching 149 ha. The
livelihood of the majority of farmers with the number of 2,503 inhabitants. The total
number of residents of
Legundi village reached 3,857 people, with the largest religious adherents of Islam
as many as 3,842 inhabitants.
From an institutional perspective, internally there are rice field owners as principal,
rice farmers as principal / agent, and farm laborers as agents. Externally there are groups
of farmers and markets (middlemen) as agents. The following summary is shown in
Figure 6:
 Mahall al    
 
Manfa’ah 


















(Musta’jir) (Ajir)    
‘Amal 
Figure 6: Contract Scheme (Akad) Rice Fielding Internally
When the owner of the rice field in Legundi Village wants to make his rice field
becomes more productive, the owner of the rice field has 2 (two) options, that is to be
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the owner of pure rice field or rice field farmer. If the owner of a pure rice field then
the form of the contract of work is usually to rent the rice fields or for the results to
those who want to work, but if you want to become a cultivator of rice fields are usually
also simultaneously as a cultivator of his own rice fields. In this position, both options
make the owner of the rice field take the position as a principal because it controls
or serves his own rice fields, unless the owner of the rice field to participate in other
people’s rice fields then the position of the owner of the rice field to be an agent. On
the other hand there are rice farmers who take a position as principal or agent. If the
rice farmers need labor in this case farm laborers, then the position of the rice farmers
can be a principal, but if the rice field worker to the owner of the rice field then his
position shifted to the agent. Not to mention the farm laborers who helped to work
the rice fields are quite wide ranging from planting to harvest. In this position, the farm
laborers make themselves as an agent for carrying out services for others in this case
the owner / owner of the rice field. In addition to internal working relationships, farmers
in Legundi Village also conduct economic transactions with external parties, in which
case the researcher focuses on farmer groups and Business and Logistics Agency
(Bulog). Farmers usually get subsidized fertilizer from farmer groups. In addition, there
is also Bulog who responds positively to the purchase of crops from farmers in Legundi
Village.
The working system of the majority of farmers in Legundi Village is to create cooper-
ation contracts between the two parties, namely the owners of paddy fields (principal)
and rice field farmers (agent). However, if viewed from a Shari’ah point of view there
is a similar meaning but with different language ie Arabic. For the form of rent (ijarah),
principal (owner) is called mu’jir, while for agent (tiller) is called musta’jir and agent (farm
labor) is called by ajir. For the result of the form of mukhabrah, the meaning is still the
owner and the cultivator of the rice field only, while the farm laborers are also called by
the ajir. The majority of crops selected by farmers in Legundi Village are rice in the 1st
planting season until the second planting season and tobacco during the third planting
season. So far, based on the observations of researchers, the majority of farmers in
Legundi Village contracts based on trust that has been running for years.
Ijarah (rent) in Legundi Village is a party who needs and / or wants to be a manpower
to help work the rice fields (ijarah services / farm labor) or want to rent and / or rent
wetland (ijarah property / lease of rice fields). This is in accordance with the definition
of Fatwa DSN MUI No: 112 / DSN-MUI / IX / 2017, namely the rent contract on the merits
of goods or ijarah ’ala al-a’yan and ijarah’ ala al-asykhash / ijarah’ala al-a ’mal, is rent
contract on the services of people. Meanwhile, mukhabarah (profit sharing) in Legundi
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village, as Suhendi predicted (2014) where the provisions of the system or how to work
with the provisions of capital from the tillers. Legundi villagers call the profit-sharing
system by mertelu (in java especially east and central java).
In Legundi Village, on ijarah contract services, usually the owner of the rice fields
calling the farm workers who have been trusted to help work the fields. Wage payment
(ujrah) using wage 1: 8 if using grain or Rp 50.000,00 per day / labor if using money.
The explanation for the division of the grain wage by 1: 8 is as follows, the total of the
crop has been divided 8 then the result is divided by the number of farm workers who
participate in the group. For example in a group there are 6 farm laborers. Within 2
days of harvest, the overall yield of paddy is 15 quintals or 1500 kg. The wage of farm
laborers is given from a count of eighth of 1500 kg which means to be 187.5 kg. From
the 187.5 kg figure is counted again the head (6 people) or the number of workers so
that one head get 31.25 kg. From this result it is usually by farm workers resold to earn
money to Karangjati Market or other markets.
As for ijara property (rent wetland) the count is annual. Generally Legundi villagers
when renting paddy fields is 1 year or 3 planting season. For example from November
this year until November next year. Rental rates are usually determined in general. For
example 15 acres (0.15 ha) is 3.5 million / year.
The second type is mukhabarah (profit sharing) where farmers provide tools and
materials while the owner provides the land to work together which then the result is
divided according to the agreement that is 1/3. The count of profit sharing in Legundi
village is the gross fetch is taken beforehand of farm laborer’s wage, then the rest is
divided 3. The comparison is 1 for the owner and 2 for the cultivator. For example, gross
revenue of Rp 1,000,000. Then taken harvest wage Rp 100,000 for farm laborers, so
the remaining Rp 900,000. The remaining money is then divided by 3 so as to get the
results of Rp 600,000 for tenants and Rp 300,000 for the owner.
Furthermore, the same as statement of Primada and Zaki (2015), cooperation con-
tracts cultivation of rice fields in the Legundi Village, Karangjati District, Ngawi Regency
has been done by hereditary by the community, especially farmers. This is done because
farmers can not afford if they have to work their own fields, because they have to pursue
the time and to alleviate the power with the ratio of broad sizes of rice fields. Inversely
when there are people who work on their own rice fields, it means that the concerned
has a rice field with a size that can be done alone.
From the results of interviews, it was found almost all the contracts done, decided
not in writing oral alias. In accordance with research Furqan (2016) this habit has been
going on for generations and the residents claimed to have never experienced adverse
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events related to the contract. The confidence of each other which is still the custom
of the villagers including the “gotong royong” or mutual cooperation is a strong reason
why among the people do not enter into a written agreement. In addition, written
agreements only exist when the agreement is over 2 years. The reason is that under
2 years is still considered small. Whereas in Legundi Village, the majority of the lease
time is not up to 2 years, but once a year the alias is extended or not depends on
the agreement of both parties. Therefore very few contracts in writing (over 2 years).
For service ijarah it is customary not to use the contract in writing, but only wage
agreements that see the benchmark in general in the farm Village Legundi. As for
mukhabarah (profit sharing) is done not written also because the parties involved do
not want complicated in the implementation. The reason the agreement has been done
long ago and if using a written contract it will look stiff. In conclusion in terms of contract
form, Legundi villagers still rely on customary law that has been going on for a long
time and hereditary according to the prevailing culture.
4. Conclusion
Based on data analysis steps such as contract identification and analysis of contract
problems in Legundi Village, Karangjati Subdistrict, Ngawi District, the researcher con-
cludes the result of contract identification of institutional perspective ie farmer consisting
of internal party and external party. Internal parties are parties directly involved in
cooperation contracts on rice field cultivation in Legundi Village, for example, farmers
consisting of the owners of rice fields, rice fields, and farm laborers. Judging from the
approach of agency theory, the position of the owner of pure rice field or rice field
owner who doubles as a rice farmer as principal, rice farmers as principal / agent and
farm laborer as agent. In contrast to external parties there is no relationship in agency
theory. Internal parties and external parties complement each other in cooperation the
cultivation of rice fields in Legundi Village.
While the contract identification from the shariah perspective is found. The contract
form that occurs in the management of rice fields in Legundi Village consists of rent
(ijara) which consists of rent of rice field (ijarah ’ala al-a’yan) and rent of farm laborers
(ijarah’ ala al-a ’mall) and profit sharing (mukhabarah) where the capital comes from the
farmers while the agricultural land comes from the owner of the rice field. For lease
contract (ijarah) is analyzed using Fatwa DSN MUI No. 112 / DSN-MUI / IX / 2017 on ijara.
As for the profit sharing agreement (mukhabarah) is analyzed using the opinion of the
scholars and Law no. 2 of 1960 on revenue sharing.
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The results of the analysis of contract issues on institutional perspectives found moral
hazard in the production sharing contract, conflicting objectives on lease contracts, and
adverse selection with farmer groups and Bulog. While the results of the analysis of
contractual problems on the perspective of sharia indicate the existence of unclear
elements of risk of harvest failure lack of awareness to pay zakat agriculture riskio
mutual suspicious on the contract of mukhabarah.
References
[1] Khallaf, A.W. (1994). Ilmu Ushul Fiqh. Terjemahan Moh. Zuhri dan Ahmad Qarib.
Semarang: Toha Putra Group.
[2] Ahmad, I. (1986). Fiqh al-Syafi’iyah. Jakarta: Karya Indah.
[3] Arrow, K. J. (1985). The Economics of Agency in Principals and Agents. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
[4] Badan Pusat Statistik. (2014). Tabel Statistik Luas Luas Lahan Sawah Menurut
Provinsi (ha) 2003-2015. Retrieved from https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/
view/id/895.
[5] Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research. London:
Sage Publication.
[6] Djazuli, A. (2010). Kaidah-Kaidah Fikih: Kaidah-Kaidah Hukum Islam Dalam
Menyelesaikan Masalah-Masalah yang Praktis. Jakarta: Kencana.
[7] Fatwa DSN-MUI No. 112/DSN-MUI/IX/2017.
[8] Furqan, M. (2016). Pengaruh Prinsip Al-Muzara’ah dan Al-Mukhabarah Terhadap
Perjanjian Bagi Hasil Pertanian (Studi di Kecamatan Semadam Kabupaten Aceh
Tenggara). Premise Law Jurnal, vol. 1, issue 9, pp. 1-17.
[9] Furubotn, E. and Ritcher, R. (2000). Institutions and Economic Theory: The
Contribution of the New Intitutional Economics. Michigan: The University of Michigan
Press.
[10] Goel, S. A. K. (2003). Contract Farming Ventures in India: A Few Successful Cases.
In V. Singh (Ed.), SPICE.
[11] Hanafie, R. (2010). Pengantar Ekonomi Pertanian. Yogyakarta: Andi.
[12] Haroen, N. (2000). Fiqh Muamalah. Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama.
[13] Hasan, A. (2006). Zakat dan Infak: Salah Satu Solusi Mengatasi Problema Sosial di
Indonesia. Jakarta: Prenadamedia.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v4i9.7335 Page 349
ICIEHI
[14] Iskandar, R. M. and Lisa, R. (2010). Analisis Data Kualitatif Model Miles and
Huberman. Jakarta: Fakultas Teknik Program Magister Pendidikan Kejuruan
Universitas Negeri Padang.
[15] Klein, B. (1980). Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangement.
The American Economic Review, vol. 70, issue 2, p. 356.
[16] Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory. (2016). The Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences. Retrieved from https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/2016/advanced-economicsciences2016.pdf.
[17] Jensen, M. C and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, issue
4, pp. 305-360.
[18] Leksono, S. (2013). Penelitian Kualitatif Ilmu Ekonomi. Malang: PT Rajagrafindo
Persada.
[19] Miller, N. (2005). Notes on the Principle-Agent Problem. Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
[20] Mallor, J. P., et al. (1998). Business Law and Regulatory Environment; Concept and
Cases. New York: Irwin McGraw-Hill.
[21] Mardani. (2014). Hukum Bisnis Syariah. Jakarta: Prenadamedia Group. Manan, A.
2011. Hukum Ekonomi Syariah Dalam Perspektif Kewenangan Peradilan Agama.
Jakarta: Prenanda Media Group.
[22] Moleong, L. (1996). Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya.
[23] Manzilati, A. (2011). Kontrak Yang Melemahkan. Malang: UB Press.
[24] Nawawi, I. (2019). Ekonomi Kelembagaan Syariah Dalam Pusaran Perekonomian
Global Sebuah Tuntutan dan Realitas. Surabaya: Putra Media Nusantara.
[25] Peraturan Menteri Pertanian Nomor: 273/Kpts/Ot.160/4/2007.
[26] Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Penyediaan dan Penyaluran Pupuk Bersubsidi Tahun
Anggaran 2018.
[27] Prasetya, F. (2012). Modul Ekonomi Publik Bagian III: Teori Informasi Asimetris.
Malang: Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Brawijaya.
[28] Pratama. (2015). Peran Zakat dalam Penanggulangan Kemiskinan: Program Zakat
Produktif pada Badan Amil Zakat Nasional. The Journal of Tauhidinomics, vol. 1,
issue 1, pp. 93-104.
[29] Primada & Zaki. (2015). Tinjauan Mekanisme Kontrak Pengelolaan Lahan Pertanian
Berbasis Adat Istiadat Dalam Kajian Fiqh Muamalah (Desa Temu, Kecamatan Kanor,
Kabupaten Bojonegoro). JESTT, vol. 2, issue 11, pp. 954-969.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v4i9.7335 Page 350
ICIEHI
[30] Profil Desa dan Kelurahan 2016.
[31] Priyadi & Shidiqie. (2015). Pelaksanaan Perjanjian Bagi Hasil Pertanian Lahan Sawah
Studi di Kecamatan Gamping, Kabupaten Sleman, Yogyakarta. Millah Jurnal Studi
Agama, vol. 15, issue 1, pp. 102-115.
[32] Putra, N. (2013). Penelitian kualitatif IPS. Bandung: Rosda.
[33] Rifqi, M. (2016). Teori Kontrak dan Nobel Ekonomi 2016. Majalah 1000guru.
[34] Rozalinda. (2017). Fikih Ekonomi Syariah. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.
[35] Suhendi, H. (2014). Fiqh Muamalah. Jakarta: Raja Pers.
[36] UU No. 2 Tahun 1960.
[37] Vardiansyah, D. (2008). Filsafat Ilmu Komunikasi: Suatu Pengantar. Jakarta: Indeks.
[38] Varian, R. H. (1993). Intermediate Microeconomics: A. Modern Approach. New York:
W.W. Norton Company.
[39] Yeager, T. J. (1999). Institutions, Transition Economies, and Economic Development.
Political Economy of Global Interdependence: Oxford.
[40] Yustika & Baks. (2015). Konsep Ekonomi Kelembagaan: Perdesaan, Pertanian dan
Kedaulatan Pangan. Malang: Empatdua.
[41] Yustika, A.E. (2012). Ekonomi Kelembagaan: Paradigma, Teori dan Kebijakan.
Jakarta: Erlangga.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v4i9.7335 Page 351
